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FOREWORD 
NASA experience has indicated a need for uniform design criteria for space vehicles. 
Accordingly, criteria are being developed in the following areas of technology: 
Environment 
Structures 
Guidance and Control 
Chemical Propulsion 
Individual topics are issued as separate monographs as soon as they are completed. A list of 
monographs published in this series can be found on the last page. 
These monographs are to be regarded as guides to design and not as NASA requirements 
except as may be specified in formai project specifications. i t  is expected, however, that the 
monographs will be used to  develop requirements for specific projects and be cited as the 
applicable documents in mission studies, or in contracts for the design and development of 
space vehicle systems. 
This monograph was prepared under the cognizance of the NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) by Matthew Barrett of Analytic Products Inc., Bethesda, Md. Scott Mills of 
GSFC was the program coordinator. 
Daniel Dembrow of GSFC served as the chairman of the Advisory Panel which provided 
guidance for the monograph’s scope and technical content. Other members of the Advisory 
Panel were : 
Larry Brace GSFC 
Kenneth Carpenter 
Elliott DeGraff Ambionics Inc. 
Dominick Gignoux Columbia Research Inc. 
John E. Jackson GSFC 
Joseph Nanevicz Stanford Research Institute 
John Robb 
John Sutton GSFC 
East Tennessee State University 
Lightning & Transients Research Institute 
Comments concerning the technical content of these monographs will be welcomed by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center, Systems 
Reliability Directorate, Greenbelt, Maryland 2077 1. 
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ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL OF 
ELECTROSTATIC CHARGES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Adverse effects of electrostatic charges on space vehicle design, development, test, and 
operations sometimes have been serious. Such effects include inadvertent ignition of electro- 
explosive devices, spurious triggering of electronics, and damage to insulating materials. The 
ignition by eiectrostatic charge of the final stage solid rocket motor of the Delta launch 
in 1964. Electrostatic charges previously had ignited a similar motor without loss of life. In 
addition, failures of several vehicles after launch have been attributed to electrostatic 
charges. 
I , vehicle for the Orbiting Solar Observatory spacecraft during test operations killed three men 
Electrostatic charges in the atmosphere can have adverse effects on launch operations. 
NASA SP-8084, revision of June 1974, gives lightning models that should be applied to 
electrostatic problems. The lightning strikes on Apollo 12, shortly after liftoff, caused 
major disturbances to on-board electrical systems. Fortunately, most of the effects in this 
case were of a temporary nature and the mission was able to continue. Later, during lunar 
surface operations of the same mission, lunar dust was found to cover many of the experi- 
ment packages and space suits, thus causing them to overheat. The attraction of the dust 
particles to the thermal control surfaces may be partially attributable to electrostatic charges. 
Electrostatic charges have been of concern in the design of scientific satellites because of the 
need to account for electrostatic effects on sensitive instruments in the ionosphere and space. 
Hazards to space vehicles can arise from electrostatic charges that are generated on board, 
externally, or by interaction between the space vehicle and its environment. Damage gener- 
ally occurs during the sudden breakdown of matter in the field between accumulated 
charges of opposite polarities. This results in a current surge which is characterized by a very 
fast rise time and a high intensity for a very short period. Techniques for minimizing the 
foregoing hazards are available, but hazardous situations are not always recognized. 
The problem of electrostatic charges sometimes is confused with problems of electro- 
magnetic interference (EMI). A program to control EM1 is not closely related to require- 
ments for preventing damaging electrostatic charges. (EM1 is treated in a separate design 
criteria monograph, NASA SP-8092.) 
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To be effective, a program to minimize the hazards of electrostatic charges must be insti- 
tuted early in the design phase and must consider all aspects of the design, test, launch, and 
operations of the launch vehicle, spacecraft, and experiments. This monograph is intended 
(1) to alert the designers of space vehicles and experiments to problems associated with 
electrostatic charges, (2) to  provide methods for assessing these problems, and (3) to show 
means for handling them. For more detailed treatment of particular aspects, the reader is 
directed to the references cited. 
Section 2 of this monograph describes experience of NASA and DOD with electrostatic 
problems, generation mechanisms, types of electrostatic hazards, and current methods for 
handling electrostatic problems. Section 3 gives guidelines for judging the possible effects of 
electrostatic charges on a space vehicle mission and methods for establishing requisite con- 
trol of electrostatic charging by design, development, and testing. Section 4 gives recom- 
mended practices and techniques for carrying out the objectives of section 3. Pertinent 
mathematical formulas and definitions are presented in the appendices. 
Also available in this series are monographs that describe the natural environments of the 
Earth and other planets. Other design criteria monographs treat space vehicle technology in 
the areas of vehicle structure, guidance and control, and chemical propulsion. All mono- 
graphs are listed at the end of this monograph. 
2. STATE OF THE ART 
2.1 Design and Operational Experience 
To obtain a practical understanding of the nature and extent of electrostatic hazards in 
space flights, it is worthwhile to review some of the documented incidents of failure or 
marunction that resulted from electrostatic charges.* The incidents show that unwanted or 
dangerous electrostatic effects may be generated by discharging aboard the space vehicle, by 
interaction with external objects on the ground, or by interaction with the atmosphere 
during flight. 
2.1.1 Ranger Studies 
During preorbital flight, some systems of a spacecraft are turned off or are in a standby 
mode. Analysis of flights indicates that during this time electrostatic discharging may occur. 
This could actuate a circuit prematurely; for example, a high voltage power supply could be 
turned on at  an altitude at which reduced atmospheric pressure may permit arcing through 
insulation. This could lead to the destruction of the power supply (ref. 2). 
*However, electrostatic charging can be used constructively; for example, the self-repulsion of a charged 
body could deploy and support in space an antenna (ref. 1). 
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2.1.2 Delta 
During testing, the X-248 rocket motor of the Delta launch vehicle was accidently ignited in 
November 1963. Again in 1964 the X-248 motor ignited accidentally during ground handling 
with fatal results. Investigation indicated that electrostatic charging had occurred when the 
nonmetallic rocket casing had been rubbed in handling of a polyethylene cover. Sudden 
movement of the polyethylene resulted in a rapid increase of the voltage associated with this 
charge. The voltage was enough to fire an igniter squib (ref. 3). 
2.1.3 Minuteman 
A buildup of electrostatic charge apparently caused two failures of Minuteman flight test 
missiles (ref. 4). The reentry vehicles of the two missiles were not electrically bonded to the 
rest of the vehicles. The apparent result was that the reentry vehicle became charged suf- 
ficiently by the engine or another mechanism to cause a spark discharge that disabled the 
missile guidance and control system. 
2.1.4 Titan 111 
Titan I11 vehicles C-10 and C-14 had guidance computer anomalies for a short interval a few 
seconds after launch, but computer performance recovered to permit successful missions. 
Investigation of these anomalies showed that the guidance computer was very sensitive to 
electrostatic discharging. Discharges across a 0.8 mm air gap that was eight feet away from 
the computer would sometimes cause an anomaly similar to that observed in the flights. 
Two possible causes were identified. As the more likely cause, the computer anomaly was 
attributed to  electrostatic charging from the circulation of cooling fluid for the computer 
through teflon-lined hose with a braided steel jacket. Some sections of this hose were not 
grounded; bench tests revealed that flow of the coolant in these sections could build up a 
sufficient charge to discharge at the altitude where the anomalies occurred. Another possible 
cause of the anomalies was triboelectric* charging of the ablative coating of the payload 
fairing by ice particles in passage through the lower atmosphere with consequent sparking 
(ref. 4). 
2.1.5 Apollo 12 
Within seconds after launch of the Apollo 12 vehicle, it was struck at least twice by 
lightning. The lightning strokes caused interruption of communications, instrument distur- 
bances, illumination of many warning lights, disconnection of fuel cells, tumbling by the 
inertial guidance system, and disturbances to the timing system. Nine measuring instruments 
were permanently damaged (ref. 5). 
The launch was made during the passage of a cold front and low clouds were present, but no 
lightning had been observed prior to liftoff. The lightning discharges appear to have been 
induced by the presence of the Apollo 12 vehicle below a cloud that carried electrostatic 
*Triboelectric (or frictional) charging is discussed in section 2.2.1. 
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charges. The conducting surfaces of the vehicle and the conducting gas plasma of its exhaust 
plume apparently formed a long cylinder which shortened the resistive distance for an 
electric discharge from the cloud to ground. Figure 1 illustrates the effect. When the field 
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Figure 1.-Distortion of lines of equal electric potential in the Earth‘s field, caused by 
Apollo 12 rocket that led to breakdown conditions above and below rocket 
(ref. 5 ) .  
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strength reached the dielectric threshold of the atmosphere, breakdown resulted between 
cloud and flight vehicle and the lightning stroke resulted. 
The discharge probably propagated both up and down from the vehicle. The path of current 
flow along the vehicle would be on its outer surface, but transient currents were induced on 
internal circuitry. 
2.1.6 Applications Technology Satellite (ATS-5) 
On August 12, 1969, the ATS-5 was launched into synchronous orbit at 105’ West longi- 
tude. Within weeks, telemetered data indicated that the spacecraft had charged up to a 
potential of - 10kV. In addition, it was concluded that observed long-term degradation of 
the aluminized Mylar thennal blankets and difficulties with telemetry could be attributed to 
sparking from differential charging of spacecraft surfaces. 
The most probable cause of the high potential charging is bombardment of the spacecraft by 
high energy charged particles of solar wind substorms. The spacecraft has potentials in the 
order of several hundred volts negative in sunlight. In eclipse, the potential can reach - 1 OkV, 
apparently because of the flux arid energy of the proton and electron plasma. The negative 
potential presumably is reduced by the opposing action of the photoelectric effect when 
ATSd is in sunlight (ref. 6). 
2.2 On-board Sources of Electrostatic Charges 
Large, stable electrostatic charges (positive and negative) can be generated on spacecraft and 
launch vehicles by several processes for which appendix C gives the fundamental equations. 
The principal on-board mechanisms are triboelectrification or friction, rocket exhaust effects, 
and fluid flow. 
2.2.1 Friction 
Triboelectrification (charge accumulation that results from rubbing or interrupted contact 
between dissimilar materials) is a major cause of electrostatic charging. In general, dissimilar 
materials acquire opposite charges when they are placed in contact or are rubbed together; 
the material with the larger dielectric constant usually bears the positive charge. Charge 
separation can even occur between two identical pieces of material provided they are rubbed 
in an assymetric way so that friction occurs at one spot on one but over a wide surface on 
the other. Experimenters have generated “triboelectric series” to indicate which material 
becomes positively charged and which becomes negatively charged. Unfortunately, one can 
not predict accurately the polarity and magnitude of the charges because they depend on the 
nature of the surface and the method of rubbing or contact. One empirical series follows: 
+platinum, paper, cellulose acetate, cellulose triacetate, 
polyethylene, aluminum, polystyrene, copper, rubber - 
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A material in this series receives electrons and acquires a negative charge when it is rubbed 
with a material that precedes it on the list; conversely, a material usually loses electrons and 
acquires a positive charge when it is rubbed with a material that follows it. Not many of the 
available electrons cross between contacting materials. About 10l2 electrons per cm2 is a 
high value but represents only about one-millionth of a coulomb; normal observations are 
lower by a factor of a hundred or so (ref. 7). 
A number of triboelectric hazards were found and corrected during the Apollo program. 
Rubbing of spacesuits and coming into contact with glass-fibered cloth, such as contained in 
a plastic couch cover, results in a charge buildup. The charge is generally small, and any 
resulting spark is not an ignition hazard under current design conditions (ref. 8). However, 
small sparks of static electricity, that were noted to result from rubbing the astronaut’s suit 
during normal operations have been evaluated for the possible hazard of their igniting a 
combustible gaseous mixture in the cabin or a combustible such as log book paper. To avoid 
such hazards, charges on spacesuits were grounded by using a biomedical sensor wire. 
Similarly, a grounded metal screen was fitted under the couch cover to prevent charge 
buildup. Storage canisters placed in teflon receptacles were observed to spark when pulled 
from the teflon. Grounding the canister during insertion and withdrawal eliminated this 
problem. 
The teflon fabric belt and pulley designed for hoisting Moon samples into the Lunar Excur- 
sion Module were also sources of electrostatic charging. Rubbing during the hoisting opera- 
tion was found to charge the belt sufficiently for it to attract dust such as hematite or 
basalt. To prevent charge accumulation, the belt was sewn in a zigzag pattern with metal 
thread that provided a path for charge drainage. Consequently, dust pickup was eliminated. 
2.2.2 Rocket Exhaust Effects 
Electrostatic charging by rocket engines has received considerable study (refs. 9, 10, 1 1, and 
12). The complex environment within the rocket chamber (where gases and plasma react at 
high temperatures) and the effects of the exhaust on vehicle charging are still not com- 
pletely understood. Charging of the rocket chamber by electrons has been proposed as well 
as several other mechanisms (refs. 13, 14, and 15). These include thermionic emission from 
the heated walls of the combustion chamber and nozzle, triboelectric charging by solid 
particles in the exhaust, photoelectric emission, and fuel atomization. 
2.2.3 Fluid Flow 
The motion of liquid rocket piopellants through pipes has been recognized as a contribution 
to the charging of liquid fuel rockets. Any spacecraft system involving non-conductive fluid 
flow can develop electrostatic effects. 
The splashing of liquids leads to “waterfall” effect in droplet-laden air. The result is charging 
of the droplets and opposite charging of the atmosphere. Charge magnitudes of about 
coulombs per gram of water have been observed in waterfalls (ref. 16). Both the waterfall ef- 
fect and liquid flow through pipes are of concern in filling vehicle tanks with liquid propellant. 
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To prevent charge accumulation, gr;ounding straps are used when fueling ships, aircraft, and 
launch vehicles. For aircraft fueling, a chemical agent for static dissipation has been intro- 
duced to eliminate charging hazards from liquid flow (ref. 17). Another technique for 
dissipating charges is by use of radioactive material when automatic equipment precludes 
possibility of exposure of persons. 
2.3 External Sources of Electrostatic Effects 
The space vehicle encounters a number of external sources of electrostatic effects during its 
operational life. From launch until the space vehicle has passed into the stratosphere, it is 
subject to  atmospheric conditions. These include ice crystals in high clouds, the vertical 
electric field gradient, and large concentrations of electric charge in rain clouds. 
The dielectric strength of the atmosphere is at a minimum at the reduced pressures of 
altitudes around 30 km. This increases the possibility that electrostatic charging will cause 
electrical breakdown of the medium between space vehicle components (sec. 2.4). 
In the ionosphere, the encounters of ions and electrons with the space vehicle have electro- 
static effects that are of concern in design of experiments. Above the ionosphere, the 
external source of electrostatic effects is the radiation flux consisting of sunlight and ener- 
getic charged particles. 
2.3.1 Lightning 
Typical thunderstorm cells are created by the heating and humidification of an air mass near 
the Earth. When this air mass rises to an altitude where the temperature is well below 
freezing, ice crystals grow and form an ice cloud. The rising, falling, and wind-created 
turbulence of the ice crystals in the presence of water droplets and snowflakes lead to 
electric charge separations in the thunderstorm cell. Charge densities of the order of 40 
C/km3 are to be expected in a typical cell (ref. 18). A schematic drawing of the mature 
stage of development of the cell is given in figure 2. NASA SP-8084 presents the currently 
accepted parameters for electric fields during fair weather, cloudiness, and thunderstorms. 
This reference gives characteristics of lightning discharges, frequency of thunderstorm days 
at NASA launch sites, and means for estimating the effect of structural height on probabil- 
ity of lightning strikes. Recent studies are developing new data in this subject area, such as 
presented in figure 3. 
Even though weather conditions are not sufficient to generate a lightning stroke from a 
thunderstorm cloud to the ground, a stroke can be triggered by the launch of a space vehicle. 
Because the vehicle is an excellent electrical conductor that presents an equipotential sur- 
face, it distorts the field between the charged cloud and the ground, as shown by figure 1. 
Sufficient localization of the field can result in breakdown such as occurred in the Apollo 
12 launch. In this case, strokes were triggered at an altitude of 1.9 km (6400 ft)  when the 
potential gradient measured near the surface was about 3500 V/m. 
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Figure 2.-The approximate charge distribution in a mature thunderstorm cell and the 
ground beneath it. (after ref. 18). 
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Figure 3.-Distribution in altitude of a measured series of lightning 
strokes to aircraft (ref. 25). 
Additional information about lightning phenomena is given in references 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
and 24. 
2.3.2 Triboelectric Charging 
Triboelectric charging, commonly called frictional charging, was discussed in connection 
with on-board sources of charging in section 2.2.1. The transfer of electrons between exter- 
nal sources and the flight vehicle is the same phenomenon. Such transfer can be expected 
whenever a flight vehicle passes through the atmosphere and is enhanced by passage through 
a dust cloud or a cloud of ice crystals. 
The rate at which a vehicle acquires a charge and the polarity of the charge depend on the 
dielectric constants of the vehicle surface and the charging particles and on the frequency 
and velocity of encounters. Measurements on commercial jet transports flying through 
clouds of ice crystals have indicated rates of accumulation of charge as high as 5x 1 0-3 C/s 
or 5 mA. One aircraft reached a potential of 500 kV (ref. 26). Higher voltages are prevented 
when loss of charge by corona discharge equals the rate of collection by aircraft motion. 
Measurements of potential on a sounding rocket flight are shown in figure 4. 
2.3.3 Atmospheric Field 
A natural potential gradient exists in the atmosphere which varies with ground location and 
weather conditions. From a fair-weather value of 100 to 300 V/m at the surface, the 
potential gradient decreases non-linearly with altitude until it reaches about 4 V/m at 10 to  
12 km.* 
*Anon.; Surface Atmospheric Extremes (Launch and Transportation Areas), NASA SP-8084, revised, 
June 1974. 
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Figure 4.-Measured electric potential of a Nike-Cajun sounding rocket flight into the 
stratosphere (ref. 27). 
This potential gradient of the atmosphere along a 100 m high vehicle ready for launch could 
result in a potential difference of over 10,000 V between the ground and the region near the 
top of the vehicle if it is not grounded. Grounding the vehicle eliminates this potential by 
allowing free charge to  flow from the Earth. The charge (equal to the product of the voltage 
and the capacitance of the vehicle) can be estimated for typical vehicles 30 to 100 m high 
with capacitances around 1000 pF to be in the order of to  10-5C (ref. 4). 
At liftoff, the plume of ionized gases between vehicle and launch pad acts as a conductor 
that momentarily retains the electrical connection with the ground and hence increases 
induction charging of the vehicle by the atmosphere. The charge may be enhanced during 
bad weather conditions because the potential gradient of the atmosphere would increase. 
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As the launch vehicle moves into regions with decreasing potential gradient, the induced 
charge tends to move across the vehicle surface to a more uniform distribution. Failure to 
provide a conductive bond between parts of the vehicle surface would prevent this motion 
and result in a potential difference across the insulating gap. In extreme conditions, sparking 
could result. 
2.3.4 Ionosphere and Space 
The potentials that can develop between the spacecraft and surrounding medium of the 
ionosphere or space are of concern in the design of sensitive experiments and scientific 
satellites. This interaction must be taken into account in design of experiments that are to  
take measurements in the medium. Sometimes the electric potential acquired by the space- 
craft serves as a reference for on-board experiments. 
2.3.4.1 Ionospheric Parameters 
The ionosphere extends outward from an altitude of approximately 60 km until it merges 
with the plasma of interplanetary space. The ionization is the result of extreme ultraviolet 
solar radiation and cosmic rays interacting with the atmosphere to  produce a plasma usually 
consisting of equal concentrations of positively and negatively charged particles. The plasma 
remains in a state of dynamic equilibrium because the loss of charged particles through re- 
combination is balanced by the creation of new particles. Because the prime source of 
energy for the ionosphere is the Sun, the parameters defining the ionosphere vary diurnally, 
seasonally, and with the solar cycle. Geographical variations that result from anomalies in 
the Earth’s magnetic field also exist. 
The density of ions and electrons in the ionosphere can vary from 1 to lo6 charged particles 
per cm3 . By comparison, there are about l o 3  charged particles per cm3 at the Earth’s sur- 
face, less than 10 particles/cm3 in the trapped radiation belt, and 1 to 10 particleslcm3 
beyond 4 Earth radii. 
2.3.4.2 Effect of Ionospheric Parameters on Spacecraft Potential 
(a) Electron-Ion Mobility Considerations 
If a vehicle enters the ionosphere with a large potential because of charging in the lower 
atmosphere, the ionosphere acts as an external ground. Consequently, ionospheric charges 
are attracted which neutralize the excess charge on the vehicle. However, the resulting 
equilibrium charge is not zero as indicated by the following process. 
Because the temperature of positive ions, principally O+ and NO+, is comparable to that of 
the much lighter electrons, the electrons have a mean velocity that is much greater than that 
of the ions. (The ratio of the mean velocities is equal to the square root of the reciprocal 
ratio of the masses.) The higher velocity electrons strike the space vehicle more often so it 
acquires a negative charge. Equilibrium is reached when the spacecraft acquires sufficient 
negative charge to reduce the electron collection rate to the ion collection rate (ref. 27). In 
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the absence of other charging mechanisms, the spacecraft equilibrium might have a negative 
potential of 0.9V at a temperature Df 2000°K according to Langmuir probe theory (ref. 28). 
Several measurements have agreed in magnitude with this result (ref. 9). 
(b) v X Effect* 
When a conductor moves through a magnetic field, an electric field E is developed across the 
conductor according to the relationship, 
where v is the velocity vector of the conductor, B is the magnetic field vector, and X 
indicates a cross product. In the case of the spacecraft interaction with the environment, the 
magnetic field is that of the Earth, and the conductor is the metallic skin or appendages of 
the spacecraft. If the spacecraft has long booms or antennas, a potential of several tens of 
volts can be developed. (This potential is E E, Le., the dot product between E and 
conductor length E). In the absence of B, the spacecraft is an equipotential surface and the 
mobility considerations discussed in section 2.3.4.2(a) cause the potential to be slightly 
negative with respect to the ambient plasma. 
The v X B effect leads to non-uniform values for the potential between the spacecraft and 
the ambient medium. The potential difference between any point on the spacecraft and the 
adjacent undisturbed plasma at a given instant can have values ranging from near zero to 
several tens of volts negative. (Electron mobility in the ionospheric plasma prevents any 
spacecraft point from acquiring a large positive potential). 
The plasma sheath that results from the V X effect is non-uniform and its thickness at any 
point varies as the spacecraft spins and thus changes orientation with respect to the mag- 
netic field. This variable sheath can have unfortunate effects on experiments mounted on 
the spacecraft such as Langmuir probes measuring ambient densities and temperature. 
One way of ameliorating this condition is to couple the antennas capacitively, at the same 
time insulating the roots of the antennas for a distance approximately equal to the radius of 
the plasma sheath.** 
2.3.4.3 Effects of Radiation Flux 
The spacecraft is also exposed to the radiation flux consisting of energetic charged particles 
and sunlight. The greatest intensity is found in the Earth’s trapped radiation belt. Energetic 
charged particles, principally electrons and protons, can penetrate the spacecraft surface and 
*M. A. Kasha treats the v X 
Gordon and Breach, 1969. 
no. 6, June 1969, p. 871 and fig. 3. 
effect in detail in “‘I‘he Ionosphere and Its Interaction with Satellites,” 
**Florida, C.  D., “Development of a Series of Ionospheric Satellites,” proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 57, 
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impart electric charges to  the spacecraft. Because of their lower mass, electrons in thermal 
equilibrium in a proton-electron plasma strike a spacecraft more often than protons, and a 
net negative charge is developed. The high energies of the particles lead to  secondary emis- 
sion of electrons that superimpose a positive charging on the primary particle charging effect. 
Sunlight adds positive charge to the spacecraft by the photoelectric effect. As a result of 
these processes, the surface of the spacecraft acquires a charge and the spacecraft acquires a 
potential. * Measurements of spacecraft potential on Sputnik 3 showed a negative potential 
that ranged from -2 to -7 V with altitude and diurnal variations. Spacecraft that operate 
outside the magnetosphere experience much larger potentials and variations, such as de- 
scribed in section 2.1.6. The emission characteristics of the surface and the presence of 
other charging mechanisms can significantly affect these results (ref. 29). Figures 5, 6, and 
7 demonstrate this dependence on surface and on the intensity and energy spectra of the 
radiation fluxes. 
Insulating surfaces such as paint generally increase the equilibrium potential so the space- 
craft’s external surface may require careful design attention. For example, sweep Langmuir 
probes carried on scientific satellites t o  measure charged particle fluxes are affected by the 
potential and its stability. Bare metal surfaces are preferable to minimize the potential and 
its variation; but to permit sufficient thermal control: a compromise such as bands of ex- 
posed metal may be necessary. 
2.4 Electrostatic Discharge 
The accumulation of electrostatic charges on electrically isolated bodies by the processes de- 
scribed in the foregoing sections could lead to a number of results that might affect the 
success of a space mission. Breakdown occurs when the electric field exceeds the dielectric 
strength of the medium. Charge then crosses the dielectric between oppositely-charged 
bodies. Heat and electromagnetic energy are emitted with passage of the charge. Besides 
the electric field strength imposed on the medium, the occurrence and severity of the dis- 
charge depend on system geometry and secondary discharge effects. 
The gaseous medium that surrounds the components of a space vehicle is particularly vul- 
nerable to breakdown in altitudes around 30 km because the dielectric strength of the at- 
mosphere passes through a minimum at the reduced pressures associated with those altitudes 
as shown by figure 8. Figure 8 also shows the range of altitudes over which breakdown 
could occur with various field strengths that might be present on the space vehicle. 
Breakdown could still be possible at much higher altitudes or even in orbit because of re- 
sidual gases and outgassing materials in the space vehicle that could increase the localized 
gas pressure until it reached the breakdown region.** 
*Appendix A of NASA SP-8049 (The Earth’s Ionosphere) provides formulas for calculating the spacecraft 
**Information on outgassing pressure in an enclosure as a function of time was developed for space flight 
potential at altitudes from the lower ionosphere into space. 
application by J. J. Scialdone in NASA GSFC Report X-327-69-529, August 1969. 
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(ref. 19). 
Breakdown of the gaseous medium occurs when the electric fields on the vehicle are strong 
enough to break apart the atoms or molecules of the medium into ions and electrons that 
then move according to  the voltage gradient. If recombination takes place before the ions 
or electrons impingc on their respective electrodes, the breakdown is considered a partial 
one and is designated corona. If the gaseous ions impinge on both electrodes, then the 
breakdown of the dielectric between them is complete and is referred to as arcing or an arc 
discharge. 
Another type of discharge are surface streamers which follow available surfaces between 
electrodes. 
Figure 9 gives the frequency bands for the radio noise produced by corona discharge, arc 
discharge, and surface streamers. 
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2.4.1 Corona Discharge 
Corona discharge usually is associated with nonuniform fields or assymetrical electrodes 
that cause concentrations of high fields at one or both electrodes. Corona discharge occurs 
when the entire gap of the gas medium is not spanned by the breakdown. Unsteady and 
fluctuating currents, increasing linearly and becoming steadier with increased potential, 
show a bluish light in the region of breakdown. The luminosity, which may be in a form 
such as a halo, a glow, or wavering rays, is the source of the term corona. The corona dis- 
charge current depends on altitude and electrode potential as shown in figure 10. 
Corona discharges can precede an electric arc in many cases if the rate of discharge is in- 
creasing (sec. 2.4.2). Corona creates radio interference noise in a broad spectrum (fig. 9). 
The rapid fluctuations of the corona that result in electromagnetic waves have rates of 
current change on the order of 1 to 10 A/ps (ref. 31). 
2.4.2 Arc Discharge 
An arc discharge is manifested by small sparks that occur when dieiectric breakdown is com- 
plete across the space between oppositely charged bodies. The sparks (with rise times of 
microseconds and peak currents of hundreds of amperes) create higher frequency distur- 
bances than the corona (fig. 9). The heat and light that are generated lead to secondary 
effects which depend on the configuration and nature of the electrodes. Each charged body 
itself will experience pitting and deterioration at the origin of the arc. Dc power supplies, 
especially of 1 or 2 kV, have been found quite vulnerable to arcing. Once an arc has oc- 
curred, the ionized gas provides a low resistance path that permits high currents to flow at 
relatively low voltages. 
To prevent arc discharge, the most sfisceptible parts of electrical circuits sometimes are 
imbedded in a solid dielectric with a high breakdown value. Another alternative is to  keep 
the power supply turtled off until the flight vehicle has passed through the critical range of 
altitudes (fig. 8). 
2.4.3 Surface Streamers 
Electrical discharge can occur across the surfaces of dielectrics. These discharges involve 
breakdown at the dielectric surface because of lowered dielectric strength of the surface 
molecular arrangement of the material or because of adhering impurities. (Surface streamers 
are not to be confused with the currents or streamers through a gas that may precede an arc 
discharge, discussed in section 2.4.2.) Triboelectrification of a dielectric, such as results 
from precipitation on a plastic vehicle surface is a common cause of surface streamers. 
Radio noise is generated by surface streamers as well as by corona and arc discharges. How- 
ever, because of the slower rise time, the noise spectrum does not extend to as high fre- 
quencies, as shown in figure 9. 
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in air (ref. 32). 
2.5 Hazards from Electrostatic Charges 
This section describes the more important types of hazards that can result from the electro- 
static charging and discharging phenomena described in the preceding sections. 
2.5.1 Electro-Explosive Device Hazards 
The electro-explosive device (EED) is a pyrotechnic power source with a single-firing 
capability that uses electricity to  initiate planned ignition. Ignition results in thermochemi- 
cal reaction that produces gas, heat, and pressure at design rates and levels. The purpose of 
EEDs on launch vehicles and spacecraft is to actuate according to  the flight schedule such 
functions as initiation, and sometimes termination, of thrust, separation of stages, removal 
of housings, and release of mechanisms. 
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The initiating circuits must be protected from stray voltages that might result from electro- 
static discharging or induced currents. Such circuits include the command input to the 
firing device. Because the command circuit may be more sensitive than the EED, it should 
be protected and desensitized as well as the line to the EED. 
There are three main types of EEDs (named by their method of actuating ignition): the 
resistive bridgewire, exploding bridgewire, and capacitive discharge. 
2.5.1.1 Resistive Bridgewire 
For this type of EED, ignition is accomplished by the heat generated in the bridgewire by a 
comparatively low voltage (0.1 to  5 V) at modest current levels (0.05 to 5 A). This type of 
EED is most frequently used in space operations because it can be protected against electro- 
static charges and it does not put great weight and volume requirements on the vehicle or 
spacecraft. The electrostatic sensitivity of this type of EED is presented in reference 34; the 
relation of sensitivity test results to probabilities of successful firing is presented in reference 
35. 
Cunent siaiwf-the-ait test iequhex,enis fOi ‘iijdge-W-iie EE”vs are “used on e;ec?io- 
static hazards of contact with the human body and exposure to stray magnetic fields (ref. 
36). The hazard from the human body is simulated in tests in which the resistive bridgewire 
must tolerate 25000 V through a 500 pF condenser with a 5000 !L? resistor without ignition 
or damage. To test against stray electric and magnetic fields, 1 A or 1 W is applied for 5 
minutes to see if ignition occurs. 
2.5.1.2 Exploding Bridgewire 
The exploding bridgewire EED requires both high voltages (2000 to 3000 V) and high power 
(20 to 1000 W) for ignition. The pulse vaporizes the bridgewire and the associated explosion 
actuates the main EED power source. This type of initiator poses little danger of initiation 
by electrostatic charges but the launch vehicle is burdened with a relatively heavy power 
supply of about 3.6 pounds. 
2.5.1.3 Capacitive Discharge 
This EED is ignited by a capacitive discharge of typically about 20 V. It is commonly used 
where only low energy is available. It is highly sensitive to electrostatic charging. If this 
type of EED is in a vehicle or spacecraft design, particular care must be taken to guard 
against stray electrostatic discharges. EED’s that can be fired by less than 1A or 1 W should 
be avoided for vehicles or systems when they can be hazardous to life. 
2.5.2 Combustible Gases 
Combustible gases may collect in several ways. Battery charging releases hydrogen gas. 
Venting of propellant gases, such as the automatic venting of cryogenically-cooled gases, can 
result in concentration of vapors in a closed compartment. Liquid hydrogen-oxygen fuel 
cells also are potential sources of explosive gas mixtures. 
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An electric discharge in a combustible mixture of gases may result in an explosive combina- 
tion because of the injection of localized and instantaneous energy. The minimum energy* 
needed for ignition varies with the mixture ratio of pairs of gases that are capable of exo- 
thermic reaction. If gas A or gas B is alone, a spark cannot cause a combustion reaction; as 
one gas is mixed with more and more of its reactive partner, the required ignition energy 
decreases to a minimum and then increases as still more of the reactive partner is added (fig, 
11). The gas pressure of the mixture is also important. The minimum ignition energy for a 
hydrocarbon-oxygen mixture ranges from 0.002 to 0.004 mJ at 1 atmosphere, and increases 
to  0.02 to 0.04 mJ at a pressure of 1/3 atmosphere (ref. 8). 
Another factor determining whether a discharge will result in chemical reaction is the 
ignition-quenching distance. This is the smallest distance over which a discharge of the 
minimum ignition energy will initiate a reaction. Across smaller gaps, discharges of greater 
amounts of energy may expend enough energy in the two conductors so that ignition is 
quenched. 
2.5.3 Electronics 
Surge currents initiated by electrostatic charge and direct or indirect surge currents of 
lightning can cause a variety of damage in electrical circuits. The heat effect of excessive 
current may cause fusing, burning, and melting of insulation on wires and thereby short or 
open circuits. Also, solder connections can be broken by surge current heating. 
The most susceptible parts of electrical circuits are solid state devices. The microsecond 
pulse induced by lightning is within the response time of these devices. A relatively low 
voltage across the device can result in permanent damage. 
2.5.4 Communications 
On-board electrostatic effects cause radio noise as described in section 2.4. Atmospheric 
precipitation also interferes electrostatically with transmissions between Earth and space- 
craft (ref. 38). 
2.5.5 Persons 
Electrostatic discharge may be hazardous to persons. A mild shock could cause a reflex 
action with secondary effects when a person is working on a delicate mechanism or is in 
cramped quarters. A discharge of about 0.25 J gives a heavy shock. An electrostatic charge 
of 10 J can be hazardous to life but is rarely encountered. 
Under certain conditions, the human body can store a charge equal to that of a 500 pF 
capacitor at 18000 V (ref. 36). A most dangerous hazard to persons is handling electro- 
explosive devices sensitive to the electrostatic charge in the human body. 
e 
*Minimum energies needed for ignition of different gas mixtures is given in NACA 1300, Basic Considera- 
tion in the Combustion of Hydrocarbon Fuels with Air, ed. by H. C. Barnett and R. R. Hibbard, 1957. 
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2.6 Methods for limiting Electrostatic Charge Problems 
2.6.1 Prelaunch Operations 
Numerous possibilities for electrostatic charging exist during the preparation for space 
flight. The charging mechanisms are essentially those that have been discussed in the preced- 
ing sections, but the sources and the extent of the effects can take various forms. High 
voltage electrical equipment can contain hazardous accumulations of charges even though 
disconnected. Incidents of electric shock and high voltage damage to circuits and instru- 
ments can generally be prevented by application of the principles given in section 2.5.3. 
The fueling of liquid rockets involves the flow of liquids through pipes and generation of 
considerable electric charge. Grounding straps generally are employed to prevent hazardous 
charge buildup. Spaces should be vented where combustible gas mixtures might otherwise 
accumulate. 
Protection of the launch vehicle on the launch pad from lightning has received serious 
attention (ref. 39). The umbilical tower alongside the vehicle is designed with sufficient 
height and conductivity to ground to act as a lightning rod. To provide low ground resis- 
tance and ensure that all points of the launch complex assume the same potential during a 
stroke, ground rods are installed. These rods distribute lightning current and shield the rest 
of the launch complex. Tall grounded objects form cones of protection; the peak of the 
cone is the top of the grounded object and the radius of the cone’s base is the object’s height 
(ref. 40). The layout of the launch complex utilizes these cones wherever possible. 
2.6.2 On-board Sources 
Methods for handling the on-board sources, reviewed in section 2.2, may be grouped into 
two categories: control of charge accumulation and reduction of discharge effects. 
2.6.2.1 Control of Charge Accumulation 
Control of charge accumulation on conductors can be accomplished by grounding. Ground- 
ing should be continuous across flexible joints, lubricated mating surfaces, and insulation. 
Designers frequently include a grounding point or tab to permit temporary grounding of 
conductive components during assembly. When a conductor must be insulated from the 
ground, the insulator should have as high a conductivity as the application permits. Surface 
agents, such as semiconducting ceramic glazes, are frequently employed. Velostat, a plastic 
sheeting used to provide temporary physical protection, has grcunding capability to  prevent 
charge accumulation,but should be used with care since it degrades with age and continued use. 
Charging of vented or dumped liquids (sec. 2.2.3) can result in attraction to a spacecraft sur- 
face. The venting of liquids has been studied in the Skylab program for possible electro- 
static hazards (ref. 41). Routing of vents away from sensitive surfaces and control of 
venting velocity are appropriate countermeasures. 
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2.6.2.2 Reduction of Discharge Effects 
The second approach to reducing electrostatic hazards is to minimize the effects of possible 
discharge. Often, a spark gap can route the arc along a safe path. An ion source such as a 
radioisotope can ionize the air so as to allow breakdown at a lower and safer potential. Wire 
stubs are frequently added to flight vehicles to provide points for corona discharge. Many 
tantalum (for ductility and strength) wires were bolted to the Minuteman missile at  the base 
of the first and second stage motors. The free ends of the wires provided points for corona 
discharge to prevent Minuteman failures such as described in section 2.1.3. Figure 12 shows 
the design finally adopted. 
2.6.3 Lightning Protection 
Three lightning models are given in NASA SP-8084, revision of June 1974 (Surface Atmos- 
pheric Extremes-Launch and Transportation Areas). Model 1 is for a very severe discharge, 
Model 2 is for a discharge with a 98 percentile peak current, and Model 3 is for a discharge 
with an average peak current. For application of the lightning models to manned space 
vehicle design, JSC-07636 of September 1973 (Space Shuttle Lightning Protection Criteria 
Document) is useful. 
2.6.3.1 Weather Watch 
*, Avoidance of lightning strokes begins with a weather watch, provided for space flights by 
the National Weather Service, the Air Force, and the Navy. Weather forecasts are developed 
for the period of exposure when the vehicle is moved to the launch complex, the work 
period at  the launch complex, and the moments of exposure during the launch. Location 
and movement of nearby weather fronts, and the on-site atmospheric electric field are kept 
under surveillance. When field monitoring or weather observations indicate excessive risk at  
launch time, countdown is delayed. The predicted passage of a large cloud cell across the 
launch area is of particular concern. The weather watch also is in operation during reentry 
of manned spacecraft and selects locations where the risk of lightning or large field gradients 
will be negligible. 
2.6.3.2 Vehicle Design 
In design, the possibility of one or more lightning strokes while the vehicle is on the launch 
pad is considered. Protection d u h g  this phase is provided by proper bonding of the space 
vehicle’s outer skin, i.e., bonding with a resistance no greater than 25 mS1 for protection 
against Lightning Model 1 (sec. 2.6.3). Protection by design measures during the launch 
phase may not be possible because of the greater vulnerability of both liquid and solid en- 
gmes while burning. Therefore careful attention is gwen to selection of suitable weather 
conditions for launch (sec. 2.6.3.1 ). 
‘Protection against currents induced inside the space vehicle is of concern. The currents that 
flow as a. resclt of a lightning stroke may not act as dc currents in their inductive effects 
because of high frequencies. JSC-07636 (Space Shuttle Lightning Protection Criteria 
Document) gives information on shielding, design of protective circuits, and wave shapes of 
induced currents. 
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3. 
3.1 
The 
CRITERIA 
Assessment of Electrostatic 
hazards from electrostatic effects to spacecraft, launch vehicles, and ground operations 
shall be assessed and their effects on personnel safety and the mission objective determined. 
For each area of consideration, the assessment must take into account extremes of ambient 
conditions, charging mechanisms, and system performance to estimate the magnitude of 
electrostatic charges. Both experimental measurements and mathematical modeling may be 
useful in the foregoing analysis. Specific consequences of electrostatic charging, such as 
inadvertent firing of electroexplosive devices or disruption of radio guidance, shall be con- 
sidered. When the assessment indicates that an unacceptable hazard or combination of 
hazards might exist, suitable measures must be provided in the design or operational pro- 
cedures. When feasible, laboratory tests shall be performed to  confirm the effectiveness of 
the design and operationai procedure in minimizing deieterious eiecrrosratic effects. 
3.2 Control Objectives 
Design of the flight vehicle and spacecraft shall be such that the effects of electrostatic 
charge accumulation and discharge from any source shall not interfere with performance or 
safety of the mission. 
Design objectives shall be specific to the final design of spacecraft and launch vehicle. When 
data on exact magnitudes of effects are not available, such data shall be requested as part of 
the test program. If needed data can not be acquired, conservative estimates shall be used. 
Design considerations shall be documented and reviewed. 
3.2.1 Fabrication and Test 
The assembly and test procedures for spacecraft and launch vehicle shall include appropriate 
measures against charge buildup and sparking. Large metal components shall be grounded to 
prevent charge accumulation. Electrical equipment shall be grounded. All grounds shall be 
tested for continuity after installation and periodically when breakage from vibration or 
other testing appears likely. 
Triboelectric effects shall be minimized, e.g., care shall be taken to avoid buildup of charge 
when polishing dielectric surfaces such as lenses, transparent insulators, and plastic parts. 
Moving belts, insulators, astronauts’ suits, and other dielectrics with potential triboelectri- 
fication shall be designed and tested with this hazard in mind. 
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Tests shall be performed on all high voltage components to determine whether sparking 
occurs under expected environmental conditions and to ensure that circuits will survive 
intentional and unintentional turn-on. 
Low voltage electronic components, especially those in the guidance and control system, 
shall be tested comprehensively because of their sensitivity to stray discharge and their 
crucial role in mission success. 
Tests for electrostatic hazards shall be performed on systems that include moving dielec- 
trics, e.g., the motion of tape in tape recorders or film in cameras. Charge buildup during 
operation in the space environment shall be measured where detectable and the associated 
hazards shall be determined. 
3.2.2 Flight 
The extent of electrostatic charging of the flight vehicle, the spacecraft, and subsystems by 
external and internal charging mechanisms shall be calculated when possible. The deleterious 
effects of charging shall be assessed. Appropriate measures shall be implemented when 
indicated by the seventy of the hazards that are determined in this assessment. 
Special attention shall be given to the following items in the performance of this analysis: 
accidental ignition of explosive devices by discharge pulses" 
provision for installation on the launch pad of sensitive initiating elements of ordnance 
currents induced in subsystems by lightning strokes" * 
0 currents induced in subsystems by arcing of high voltage units 
ignition of flammable vapors or materials by discharges 
deterioration of insulation and other dielectrics due to breakdown 
effects of potential, such as attraction of dust, corona discharge, and charged particle 
attraction 
0 effects of discharge pulses on communications 
devices, solid propellant devices, and destruct charges ( r 4  39). 
- ~ 
*Reference 39 establishes categories A and B for explosive devices and provides specific procedures for 
handling each type. In category A are those devices that if fired unintentionally could cause death or 
injury to persons or major property damage by themselves or through a train of events. 
**NASA SP-8084, revision of June 1974, gives three lightning models (sec. 2.6.3). 
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3.3 Management for Electrostatic Charge Control 
Management practices to avoid electrostatic hazards are of particular significance because 
their existence may be unsuspected before investigation. Personnel safety should have 
highest priority. The status of the electrostatic control effort should be reported periodi- 
cally to project management. The objective should be to discover possible electrostatic 
hazards and plan preventive measures early in the program. This may be carried out in three 
phases. 
First, management should place emphasis on electrostatic hazards during the design phase 
by assignment of individual responsibility for (a) assessment of electrostatic effects, (b) 
development of specific standards for electrostatic control consistent with the mission, and 
(c) application of the foregoing standards to design, fabrication, assembly, testing, launch 
operations, and flight. Second, management should initiate tests and measurements to 
ensure that (a) the systems as designed satisfy the foregoing standards, and (b) the flight 
system as assembled also meets these standards. Third, management should include a system 
for review of unexpected electrostatic effects encountered during operational tests of the 
hardware. 
4. RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 
4.1 Design 
4.1.1 Grounding Obiectives 
Many internal electrical hazards can be eliminated by electrical grounding to the vehicle 
shell. Ground wires should be used for individual systems when appropriate. Wires should 
be adequate to carry a surge of current without mechanical damage. Grounding is normal 
practice for electrical circuit design and should not be neglected in design of a mechanical 
apparatus or an astronaut’s suit. As discussed in section 2.2, a charge can be generated 
almost anywhere. The amount of static charge that an electrically isolated man can ac- 
cumulate is sufficient to ignite combustible gas vapors unless his suit is grounded. A high 
resistance ground is usually satisfactory to  discharge surfaces susceptible to electrification 
by contact. 
4.1.2 Shielding by the Vehicle Shell 
Many internal electrostatic hazards can be eliminated by electrical bonding of the vehicle 
shell. All sections of the vehicle’s outer shell should be bonded together to permit large 
quantities of electric charge to distribute across the shell by conducting paths. The bonded 
shell of the space vehicle then acts as an electrical shield to protect internal structures from 
lightning and atmospheric electricity. However, induced currents can develop when lightning 
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strikes. The effects of such currents should be assessed for the lightning models of NASA 
SP-8084 (sec. 2.6.3). 
4.1.3 High Voltage Electronics 
High voltage devices include high voltage generators, photomultiplier tubes, video tubes, and 
charged particle detectors. High voltage devices may have charged components at potentials 
that are significantly different from those of the spacecraft structure. Electrical discharge is 
a special hazard associated with such devices; lesser electrostatic effects are ion attraction, 
dust attraction, and dielectric strain. 
Because a charge is unavoidable on the ungrounded side of a high voltage device, precautions 
must be taken to  reduce electrostatic effects. The tendency to  discharge can be minimized 
by removing sharp edges, turns, and points on the high voltage conductors. Recommended 
steps to  prevent the contact of the gaseous atmosphere with the high voltage conductors 
are potting or hermetic sealing and pressurization. For missions of long duration, potting 
is much preferred. If the high voltage device is to  be accessible for repair, potting com- 
pounds should be selected that can be removed partially to expose the defective component 
and then be replaced by new material which will bond completely to the old. When potting 
compound is used, a prime requirement is that it must adhere completely to all conductors 
to prevent air gaps or voids because they could be locations for possible breakdowns. Care 
should be taken to  avoid entrapping bubbles of gas in potting. 
Units should be vented to  the outside vacuum of space for outgassing. Grounded shields 
should be used over the insulation of high voltage cabling to contain strong electric fields 
within the cable and prevent external structures from inducing a discharge (ref. 43). 
4.1.4 low Voltage Electronics 
The low voltage circuits whose performance would affect mission success should be care- 
fully assessed in the design stage against electrostatic hazards, particularily induced current 
pulses. Guidance and control circuits are of particular concern. The hazards of electrostatic 
buildup and discharge are often less well-recognized for low voltage electronics than for high 
voltage electronics. 
Low voltage devices, the normal electronics of a space vehicle, should be designed to  
minimize coupling with high voltage devices, corona discharges, and lightning strokes. The 
conservative practices of short cables and conductive sheathes should be employed. Sensitive 
components, notably solid state devices, should be protected from high frequency pulses. A 
resistor-capacitor circuit in the lead to the base of a transistor can protect it against such 
pulses. When a critical component or circuit appears vulnerable, redundant circuits, isolated 
from each other, should be provided: 
For the exterior of the spacecraft, the plasma of space acts as a conductor that should be 
considered in the design of exterior electronics. For example, exposed terminals of solar 
cells can collect electrons and increase the negative charge of the spacecraft. Therefore, the 
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positive side of the solar cell should be grounded and terminals should be insulated if 
feasible. In general, positive leads should be disconnected with a relay or other device when 
they are exposed to  space. 
4.1.5 Dielectrics 
Electrostatic charge on a dielectric can lead to radio noise and possible hazards from arcing. 
In some cases, this may be prevented by coating the dielectric with a conducting material. 
Stannous oxide, which is conductive yet transparent, should be considered for glass surfaces. 
Velostat, a carbon-impregnated polyethylene, may be used where polyethylene can cause an 
electrostatic buildup, but velostat does degrade with age and continued use. Metal threads 
or wires, as mentioned in section 2.2.1 , can reduce dielectric problems in fabrics. 
Dielectrics in capacitors should be tested for their dielectric strength. If a breakdown occurs 
during operation, the discharge can tear a hole in the dielectric and reduce the capacitance. 
A major loss of dielectric material would cause the capacitance to approach that of an air 
gap capacitor. 
Dielectrics used for insulation of high voltazes should have a  substantial!;^ higher rating thar, 
is required in ground-based systems. It is not unusual to require 2 to 5 times the normal 
rating. 
Insulation should fit snugly onto conductors and be free of voids. Gas trapping underneath 
the dielectric or as bubbles in the material should be avoided. Gas pockets in wire coatings, 
potting compounds, or conformal coatings are particularly hazardous because the boundary 
between a solid dielectric and a gas of lower dielectric constant gives rise to an increase in 
electrical stress on the gas. This could cause a breakdown in the gas and heating and 
decomposition of adjacent insulation. 
4.1.6 Electro-Explosive Devices 
These devices, including squibs, igniters, spin and tumble rockets, explosive bolts, destruc- 
tors, detonators, and other pyrotechnic units aboard space vehicles, should be thoroughly 
protected from electrostatic effects. The typical resistive bridgewire EED is ignited by an 
electric pulse, of low voltage (0.1 to  50 V) and low current (0.05 to 5 A). An electro- 
magnetic pulse generated by nearby transmitters or an electrostatic discharge can readily 
induce a current within an unprotected sensitive EED and ignite it (ref. 39). Therefore, tests 
should be performed to determine sensitivity to  nearby electrostatic discharges as well as to 
electrical discharges to the EED itself. 
To prevent EED ignition, it is recommended that the pyrotechnic should be completely 
shielded from external sources. The conductive parts of the device should be electrically 
bonded together either by mechanical contact, connecting wires, or conductive resins. Selec- 
tion of a high-resistance material should be made for use between the firing circuits and the 
case to dissipate any accumulation of charge without affecting proper functioning of the 
EED (ref. 35). 
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4.1.7 Installation of Ordnance Devices 
Ordnance devices, such as solid propellant rocket motors and destruct charges, should be 
designed so that the sensitive initiating elements can be installed just prior to hookup on the 
launch pad. The ordnance devices should be accessible to  facilitate installation and electrical 
connection as late as possible in the launch countdown (refs. 36 and 39). 
4.2 Testing 
Extensive testing of spacecraft and launch vehicle is essential. Electrostatic testing should be 
based on the measurement of the hazards and effects described in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 
Although it is often not feasible to simulate certain extreme charging mechanisms, notably 
the effects of rocket exhaust, lower levels can often be simulated and extrapolated to the 
expected level. This is useful for the effects of lightning* and sustained operation under 
space conditions. When such an approach is necessary, the analysis should be documented 
and reviewed. An important factor to be considered in an extrapolation is that discharge is a 
threshold phenomenon. The electric fields during flight operations can be evaluated by 
scaling the measured field. To account for discharge and discharge effects, however, requires 
an analysis of dielectric strength, geometry, and other factors as described in section 2.4. 
High voltage electrical systems should be tested for susceptibility to  discharge at sustained 
critical pressure and also under a hard vacuum ( torr) of sufficient duration to ensure 
that any small bubbles within an encapsulated circuit reach critical pressure (ref. 43). 
X-ray photography is recommended if voids in potting are to be investigated. An alternative 
is to  use transparent potting compound so that a microscope can be used to check for gas 
bubbles. 
Dielectric bodies should be tested to  determine their charge retention. A measurement 
should be made of the time constant for removal of charge. The dielectric strength of the 
material should be verified by measurement on the batch used. 
Application of voltage to a system requires certain precautions. The connectors and cabling 
to the test specimen must be designed to carry high voltages. Special connectors and vacuum 
feedthroughs should be used when the voltages do not exceed about 150 V. Above this 
level, it is recommended that the high voltage supply be placed in the vacuum chamber and 
hard-wired to the system under test. However, the power supply must first be made dis- 
charge free. When testing a circuit with multiple high voltage supplies, it is recommended 
that separate low voltage supplies be used so that discharge transients or noise are not 
coupled directly to the high voltage circuitry (ref. 43). 
*A number of lightning simulation techniques are discussed by D. W. Clifford in the 1973 IES Proceedings 
(Anaheim, Calif.), April 2-5, 1973, pp. 388-396. 
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Spacecraft launch operations have been extensively studied for electrostatic hazards ranging 
from arcing that results from charge buildup during prelaunch operations to the hazards of 
atmospheric electricity. It is recommended that management of a launch take full cogni- 
zance of the precautions which have been developed. Close and frequent coordination of 
information-gathering groups and launch operation groups is essential. There should be 
flexibility in launch dates to avoid adverse atmospheric conditions. Rescue and emergency 
backup personnel should be trained and available in the event of electrical shocks, lightning 
damage, or fires of electrical origin. 
Electrostatic hazards should be taken into account in operational control of the flight 
vehicle after liftoff and the spacecraft after its separation. It will be necessary in some 
designs to keep certain high voltage equipment turned off until above the ionosphere to 
forestall arcing at the altitude where the Paschen minimum occurs in the atmosphere. 
Buildup of electric potential as a result of onboard and external sources described in section 
2 can be expected. The general hazards described in this document may not include a hazard 
unique to a particular mission, as for example the docking of a spice sbuttle (ref. 44j. T i e  
unique aspects of each Tight mission should be explored for electrostatic hazards. If neces- 
sary, the system design and mission operations should be modified to control serious 
electrostatic effects that are revealed. 
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APPENDIX A 
ELECTROSTATIC SYMBOLS 
AND COMMON UNITS 
The International System of Units (SI) provides conventional symbols for the units em- 
ployed in calculation of electrostatic effects. Listed below are some of the symbols, units, 
and conversion factors that relate them to some familiar units and fundamental quantities. 
SYMBOL 
S 
m 
m2 
N 
A 
C 
F 
J 
V 
8 
eV 
QU ANT I TY UNIT MULTIPLY BY 
time second - 
length meter 39.37 
area square meter 1550 
force newton 0.225 
current ampere 1 
charge coulomb 6.25 x 10l8 
capacitance farad 1 O6 
energy joule 9.48 x 10-4 
0.239 
potential volt 300 
resistance ohm - 
kinetic energy electrovolt 1.60 x loe1’ 
TO OBTAIN 
- 
inches 
square inches 
pounds 
cou lom bdsecond 
electrons 
microfarads 
BTU 
ca I or ies 
statvo Its 
joules 
SI prefixes and symbols used to denote decimal multiples of quantities follow. 
Multiples 
1 09 
1 o6 
103 
10-3 
10-6 
10-9 
10-l2 
Prefixes 
gigs 
mega 
kilo 
milli 
micro 
nano 
pic0 
Symbols 
G 
M 
k 
m 
P 
n 
P 
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APPENDIX B 
SOME FORMULAS FOR 
ELECTROSTATIC CALCULATIONS 
The following formulas from electrostatic theory are presented to provide a ready reference. 
The symbols have been defined in appendix A. Subscripts on symbols refer to their value for 
each of the physical items considered. 
Resistors in series - 52 = a1 + a2 + a3 + * - - -  
Resistors in parallel - 1 +- + . . . .  +- 1 1 -  1 
52 521 522 523 
- - -  
- 1 -   - + - + - +  1 1 1 . . . .  
F Fl F2 F3 
Capacitors in series - 
Capacitors in parallel - F = F, + F2 + F3 + e - - -  
Coulomb’s Law - N = (C1C,)/(4mm2) 
where N is the force between charges C, and C, , separated by distance m, in a medium 
of permittivity E. 
E = kg0 
where k equals unity in air and space and is the measured dielectric constant in other 
mediums, and go = 8.84 X F/m. 
Potential from a distribution of charges - 
-k m, c, + - c3 + ...I 
m3 
where ml is the distance of charge C, from the point of potential V. 
Definition of capacitance - F = C/V 
Electrostatic energy stored in a capacitor - 
J = y F V 2  1 
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Calculation of Capacitance - 
1. The capacitance F can often be calculated from the dimensions and shape of the body 
receiving the charge. 
capacitance of a sphere of radius r F = 4ner 
capacitance of a prolate spheroid (cigar shape) 
4ne J-iT7 
tanh-' d w  F =  
where b is half the length and a is half the width of the spheroid. 
2. When two bodies are charged equally and oppositely, the potential between them is given 
by the charge on one divided by the capacitance of the system. This capacitance often can 
also be calculated from geometric parameters. The capacitance for simple configurations 
often encountered is given below. 
Parallel plates eA/d 
Concentric cylinders 
Concentric spheres 
Parallel cylinders 
Sphere above a flat surfaces 
2ne L 
ne L p + JF 3 
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A 
d 
L 
r2 
r1 
In 
r 1 
r2 
L 
D 
a 
In 
- r 
h 
area 
separation 
length 
outer radius 
inner radius 
natural logarithm 
inner radius 
outer radius 
length 
distance bet ween 
centers 
cylinder radius 
natural logarithm 
radius 
distance, sphere 
center to surface 
(h greater than 2r) 
APPENDIX C 
CHARGING AND 
DISCHARGING EQUATIONS 
A charged body which is not absolutely isolated will lose its charge at a rate controlled by 
the electrical resistance of the conducting path to ground. A charged capacitor will lose its 
charge at a rate controlled by the electrical resistance of the medium between the oppositely 
charged objects. Let the resistance be 52 ohms, and let the capacitance of the charged body 
be F farads. After a time lapse of s seconds, the quantity of charge on the body has been 
reduced from C o  to C according to the equation 
which implies that in 352F seconds, 95% of the charge is gone. By differentiating this 
equation, we can determine the rate at which charge leaks from the body as a function of 
time. When a constant source of charge to the body is also present, the leakage rate increases 
until it reaches the source rate of charging. At any time, the charge will be changing at a rate 
of 
coulombs/second 1 - -  dC - --C + A  ds S2F 
where A coulombs are delivered per second by the charging mechanism, such as the rubbing 
of another object. At equilibrium, the body reaches a constant quantity of charge. The 
equation gives this quantity as 
C = 52AF 
Because capacitance F equals C/V, the equilibrium potential is equal to the product A n .  
The importance of making the resistance of the conducting path to ground as small as 
possible is evident. 
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NASA SPACE VEHICLE DESIGN 
CRITERIA MONOGRAPHS 
ENVIRONMENT 
SP-8005 
SP-80 10 
SP-80 1 1 
SP-80 ! 3 
SP-80 17 
SP-8 0 2 0 
SP-802 1 
SP-8023 
SP-803 7 
SP-8038 
SP-8049 
SP-8067 
SP-8069 
SP-8084 
SP-8085 
SP-809 1 
SP-8 0 9 2 
Solar Electromagnetic Radiation, revised May 197 1 
Models of Mars Atmosphere (1967), May 1968 
Models of Venus Atmosphere (1972), revised September 1972 
Meteoroid Environment Model- 1969 (Near Earth to Lunar Surface), 
March 1969 
Magnetic Fields-Earth and Extraterrestrial, March 1969 
Mars Surface Models (1 968), May 1969 
Models of Earth’s Atmosphere (90 to 2500 km), revised March 1973 
Lunar Surface Models, May 1969 
Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Magnetic Fields, September 
1970 
Meteoroid Environment Model- 1970 (Interplanetary and Planetary). 
October 1970 
The Earth’s Ionosphere, March 197 1 
Earth Albedo and Emitted Radiation, July 197 1 
The Planet Jupiter (1 970), December 197 1 
Surface Atmospheric Extremes (Launch and Transportation Areas), 
revised, June 1974 
The Planet Mercury (1971), March 1972 
The Planet Saturn (1970), June 1972 
Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Electromagnetic Interference, 
June 1972 
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SP-8 1 03 
SP-8 105 
STRUCTURES 
SP-800 1 
SP-8002 
SP-8003 
SP-8004 
SP-8 006 
SP-8007 
SP-8008 
SP-8009 
SP-80 12 
SP-80 14 
SP-80 19 
SP-8022 
SP-8029 
SP-803 1 
SP-8032 
SP-803 5 
SP-8040 
SP-8042 
SP-8043 
The Planets Uranus, Nepture, and Pluto (1971), November 1972 
Spacecraft Thermal Control, May 1973 
Buffeting During Atmospheric Ascent, revised November 1970 
Flight-Loads Measurements During Launch and Exit, revised June 
1972 
Flutter, Buzz, and Divergence, July 1964 
Panel Flutter, revised June 1972 
Local Steady Aerodynamic Loads During Launch and Exit, May 
1965 
Buckling of Thin-Walled Circular Cylinders, revised August 1968 
Prelaunch Ground Wind Loads, November 1965 
Propellant Slosh Loads, August 1968 
Natural Vibration Modal Analysis, September 1968 
Entry Thermal Protection, August 1968 
Buckling of Thin-Walled Truncated Cones, September 1968 
Staging Loads, February 1969 
Aerodynamic and Rocket-Exhaust Heating During Launch and 
Ascent, May 1969 
Slosh Suppression, May 1969 
Buckling of Thin-Walled Doubly Curved Shells, August 1969 
Wind Loads During Ascent, June 1970 
Fracture Control of Metallic Pressure Vessels, May 1970 
Meteoroid Damage Assessment, May 1970 
Design-Development Testing, May 1970 
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SP-8044 
SP-8045 
SP-8046 
SP-8050 
SP-805 3 
SP-8054 
SP-8055 
SP-8056 
SP-8057 
SP-8060 
SP-806 1 
SP-8062 
SP-8063 
SP-8066 
SP-8068 
SP-8072 
SP-8 07 7 
SP-8 07 9 
SP-8082 
SP-8083 
SP-8095 
Qualification Testing, May 1970 
Acceptance Testing, April 1970 
Landing Impact Attenuation for Non-Surface-Planing Landers, April 
1970 
Structural Vibration Prediction, June 1970 
Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects on Materials, June 1970 
Space Radiation Protection, June 1970 
Prevention of Coupled Structure-Propulsion Instability (Pogo) , 
October 1970 
Fiight Separation Mechanisms, October 1970 
Structural Design Criteria Applicable to  a Space Shuttle, revised 
March 1972 
Compartment Venting, November 1970 
Interaction with Umblicals and Launch Stand, August 1970 
Entry Gasdynamic Heating, January 1971 
Lubrication, Friction, and Wear, June 197 1 
Deployable Aerodynamic Deceleration Systems, June 197 1 
Buckling Strength of Structural Plates, June 1971 
Acoustic Loads Generated by the Propulsion System, June 1971 
Transportation and Handling Loads, September 197 1 
Structural Interaction with Control Systems, November 197 1 
StressCorrosion Cracking in Metals, August 197 1 
Discontinuity in Metallic Pressure Vessels, November 197 1 
Preliminary Criteria for the Fracture Control of Space Shuttle 
Structures, June 1971 
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SP-8099 Combining Ascent Loads, May 1Y72 
SP-8 104 Structural Interaction With Transportation and Handling Systems, 
January 1973 
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL 
SP-80 15 
SP-80 16 
SP-80 18 
SP-8 024 
SP-8026 
SP-8027 
SP-8028 
SP-8033 
SP-8034 
SP-8036 
SP-8047 
SP-8058 
SP-8059 
SP-8065 
SP-8070 
SP-807 1 
SP-8074 
SP-8078 
Guidance and Navigation for Entry Vehicles, November 1968 
Effects of Structural Flexibility on Spacecraft Control Systems, 
April 1969 
Spacecraft Magnetic Torques, March 1969 
Spacecraft Gravitational Torques, May 1969 
Spacecraft Star Trackers, July 1970 
Spacecraft Radiation Torques, October 1969 
Entry Vehicle Control, November 1969 
Spacecraft Earth Horizon Sensors, December 1969 
Spacecraft Mass Expulsion Torques, December 1969 
Effects of Structural Flexibility on Launch Vehicle Control Systems. 
February 1970 
Spacecraft Sun Sensors, June 1970 
Spacecraft Aerodynamic Torques, January 197 1 
Spacecraft Attitude Control During Thrusting Maneuvers, February 
197 1 
Tubular Spacecraft Booms (Extendible, Reel Stored). February 
1971 
Spaceborne Digital Computer Systems, March 197 1 
Passive Gravity-Gradien t Libration Dampers, February 197 1 
Spacecraft Solar Cell Arrays, May 197 1 
Spaceborne Electronic Imaging Systems, June 197 1 
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SP-8 0 8 6 Space Vehicle Displays Design Criteria, March 1972 
SP-8096 Space Vehicle Gyroscope Sensor Applications, October 1972 
SP-8098 Effects of Structural Flexibility on Entry Vehicle Control Systems, 
Jxne 1972 
SP-8 102 Space Vehicle Accelerometer Applications, December 197 2 
CHEMICAL PROPULSION 
SP-8025 Solid Rocket Motor Metal Cases, April 1970 
SP-8039 
SP-804 1 
3P-8048 
SP-805 1 
SP-8052 
SP-8064 
SP-8075 
SP-8 07 6 
SP-8080 
SP-808 1 
SP-8087 
SP-8090 
SP-8 10 1 
Solid Rocket Motor Performance Analysis and Prediction, May 
197 1 
Captive-Fired Testing of Solid Rocket Motors, March 197 1 
Liqaid Rocket 5Egir.e Turbspuzp Bearings, Mach 1 9? 1 
Solid Rocket Motor Igniters, March 1971 
Liquid Rocket Engine Turbopump Inducers, May 197 1 
Solid Propellant Selection and Characterization, June 197 1 
Solid Propellant Processing Factors irf Rocket Motor Design, 
October 1971 
Solid Propellant Grain Design and Internal Ballistics, March 1972 
Liquid Rocket Pressure Regulators, Relief Valves, Check Valves, 
Burst Disks, and Explosive Valves, March 1973 
Liquid Propellant Gas Generators, March 1972 
Liquid Rocket Engine FluidCooled Combustion Chambers, April 
1972 
Liquid Rocket Actuators and Operators, May 1973 
Liquid Rocket Engine Turbopump Shafts and Couplings, September 
1972 
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